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American Yearbook: An Early Portrait of the
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause
American Yearbook v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D .
Fla. 1972 )
by Cem Akleman

I

n American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 1 a threejudge 2 panel3 of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida upheld
several Florida laws requiring that printed materials purchased

Cem Akleman is aJ.D. Candidate (2013) at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law. The author thanks Paul Pakidis, Zack Smith, Erica Perdomo, and Kathryn
Kimball, each of whom kindly provided input and encouragement.
1
339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
2
The opinion was written by then-District Court Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, who
was later appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. When
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was created by
Congress, Judge Tjoflat was reassigned to it and later served as chief judge
from 1989 to 1996. See Biographical Directory ofFederal judges: Tjojlat, Gerald Bard,
FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=2674&cid=999&cty
pe=na&instate=na (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Judge George C. Young also
served on the panel. Judge Young was a member of all three district courts in
Florida and served as the Middle District's ChiefJudge from 1973 until he took
senior status in 1981. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Young, George
Cress/.er, FED.JUD. CTR., http:// www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=2393&cid=9
99&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). The final judge on the
panel was Judge David Dyer, who served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and then on the newly created Eleventh Circuit until his passing
in 1998. See Biographical Directory of Federal judges: Dyer, David William, FED. Juo.
CTR., http:/ / www.fjc.govI servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=675&cid=999&ctype=na&inst
ate=na (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
Threejudge panels were formerly required to issue "an interlocutory or
3
permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of
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by the state be manufactured in Florida. 4 The court held that the
laws were proper under the Dormant Commerce Clause 5 and
· the Equal Protection Clause 6 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
constituted a proper delegation of power by the Florida Legislature
under the Florida Constitution. 7 The opinion was later summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court8 and subsequently cited 9 by the
Court in opinions that set forth the market participant exception 10
to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
This Comment explains the background of the case and relates
the history of the relevant doctrines on which the district court
relied to make its decision. Finally, this Comment discusses how
American Yearbook was forward-looking and quite possibly the first
case to set forth the then-unformed market participant exception.
American Yearbook Company operated an out-of-state business
printing yearbooks for secondary schools and colleges, both public
and private. 11 Prior to 1970, American Yearbook won contracts to

4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11

a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality." 28 U .S.C. § 2281 (repealed
1976). A threejudge panel carries with it an appeal of as a matter of right
to the Supreme Court. 28 U .S.C. § 1253 (2006). However, in 1976, Congress
repealed most statutes requiring the use of threejudge panels. The remaining
statutes requiring threejudge panels include 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2006), which
involves actions "challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of ... d
istricts or ... legislative bod[ies]," and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a)(5) (2006), which requires panels in cases about voter qualifications
in suspect jurisdictions. See generally ROBERT L. STERN & Eu GE E GRESSMA ,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 90-140 (5th ed. 1978) (discussing appellate
jurisdiction over threejudge panels).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 719-20, 725.
Unlike the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Dormant
Commerce Clause (also called the Negative Commerce Clause) is not expressly
stated in the Constitution. Rather, it is a constitutional doctrine that courts
have developed to address the negative or converse implied by the Commerce
Clause. It is premised on the idea that when a state passes a law that unduly
burdens interstate commerce, that law improperly infringes on Congress'
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n
v.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
U.S. Co ST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720-21, 725.
Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
See infra notes 49- 73 and accompanying text.
In brief, the market participant exception provides that when a state is
participating in the marketplace like a private business (rather than acting in
its governmental function as a sovereign), it is not regulating commerce and
thus is not subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause. For a fuller explanation
of this principle, see infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720.
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print yearbooks for schools in Florida. 12 In 1970, the company bid on
a yearbook contract at the University of South Florida. 13 Even though
it entered the lowest bid, the university denied American Yearbook
the contract because the company did not have any manufacturing
facilities within the state, and state law14 prohibited the out-of-state
fulfillment and manufacturing of public printing contracts. 15
American Yearbook then brought suit in the Middle District of
Florida, challenging the constitutionality of the printing statutes on
three separate grounds. 16 First, the company argued that the Florida
Legislature had, in violation of the Florida Constitution, improperly
delegated to the Department of General Services the power to
determine whether printings were Class A (those printings ordered
by the Florida Legislature or Florida Supreme Court) or Class B
(all other state printings). 17 The court dismissed this argument on
its face, reasoning that while it is true that the Florida Legislature
cannot delegate its legislative power, it had clearly defined the classes
of printings-the legislative portion of the governmental act-and
only allowed the Department of General Services "to regulate the
manner by which Class B contracts can be let. "18 Thus, the Legislature
had not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
Next, American Yearbook argued that the state statutes violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

12
13

14

15
16
17
18

Brief for Appellant at 5, Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U .S. 904 (1972) (No.
72-25).
Id. At the time of the action, the university had campuses in Tampa and St.
Petersburg, Florida, the heart of the Middle District. See USF History, UNIV.
S. FLA., http: / / www.usf.edu/ About-USF / usf-history.asp (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
The company focused primarily on three subsections of Section 283 of the
Florida Statutes. See Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 719-20 nn.1-3. Section 283.03
required that" [a] ll the public printing of this state shall be done in the state."
FLA. STAT.§ 283.03 (1927) (repealed 1983). Section 283.04 divided printing
into two classes: Class A was defined as "printing required for the legislative
department of the state government," and Class B was defined as any printing
by the state "not included in class A." FLA. STAT. § 283.04 (1969) (repealed
1983). Section 283.10 loosened the requirements for Class B printings, but still
required that the printer "manufacture the [printings] within the state." FLA.
STAT.§ 283.10(1) (1969) (repealed 1983). The printings at issue were Class B
as defined by the statutes.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 5.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720.
Id.
Id. at 720-21.
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differing in their treatment of public and private contracts. 19 To
begin its analysis, the court distinguished the two types of power
_that a state exercises with respect to the Commerce Clause.
One type is governmental power, which is the use of power by
the sovereign to govern and regulate its people. The other is
proprietary or business power, which arises when the state acts to
requisition property through public contracts or otherwise provide
for the internal needs of the government. 20
The court looked to the rationale in Atkin v. Kansai2 1 to
answer the question of whether the printing contracts fell within
the governmental function or proprietary function of the state. 22
In Atkin, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute imposing criminal liability on employers who forced
their employees to work more than eight hours per day on a state
contract. 23 The Court found no equal protection violation, even
though that same conduct was legal when working on a private
contract, because placing conditions on a state contract fell
within the proprietary function of the state. 24 The Supreme Court
further explained that " [ t] he rule of conduct prescribed by [the
law] applies alike to all who contract to do work on behalf ... of
the State .... "25 Similarly, with respect to public school printing
contracts, the statute applied equally to all printers, even though it
did not apply to printing contracts at private schools. 26
To counter the unfavorable rule from Atkin, American
Yearbook argued that the rulings of the Supreme Court in Shapiro
v. Thompson27 and Graham v. Richardson28 undermined the holding
in Atkin such that the Equal Protection Clause required the court to
strike down the printing statute. 29 Shapiro and Graham invalidated

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 720. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Co ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 721.
191 U.S. 207 (1903).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 721-22.
See Atkin, 191 U.S. at 207-08, 223-24.
/d_ at 222-23.
Id. at 224.
Cf Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 723 (finding no Equal Protection Clause
violation).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 722.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/15

4

Akleman: American Yearbook: An Early Portrait of the Market Participant Ex

AMERICAN YEARBOOK

317

state welfare laws that discriminated against protected classes. 30 The
American Yearbook court distinguished those cases on the ground
that welfare is clearly a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary,
function of the state, while the action in this case was proprietary;
additionally, those cases discriminated against suspect classes
whereas the instant case did not involve any protected classes. 31
Therefore, the court found that the statutes did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, and most importantly, American Yearbook argued
that the printing statute was such an undue burden on interstate
commerce that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 32 The
court again deployed the distinction between the governmental
and proprietary functions of the state. 33 It drew on Field v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 34 a Supreme Court case analyzing a Missouri
statute that required that asphalt for a public paving project
originate from a specific asphalt deposit. 35 The plaintiff in Field
pointed out that some of the required asphalt was from a foreign
country, and argued that, by bypassing asphalt available from other
states, the statute burdened interstate commerce. 36 The Court
rejected this argument, noting that while there was some burden
on interstate commerce, the effect was too remote to be considered
a direct interference with Congress' exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce. 37 The American Yearbook court used this rule
as support for the proposition that while proprietary purchases do
affect interstate commerce, the effect must be substantial enough
to trigger an examination under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The court also considered MacMillan Co. v. Johnson, 38 which
upheld a Michigan statute specifying the condition of textbooks
purchased by state school districts. 39 The plaintiffs in MacMillan
argued that by dictating the condition of books that school districts
could purchase, the state controlled the price of books shipped

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See id.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 723.
Id.
194 U.S. 618 (1904).
Id. at 619.
See id. at 623.
See id.
269 F. 28 (E.D. Mich. 1920).
Id. at 29, 32-33.
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into the state. 40 The MacMillan court reasoned that the law merely
required that when the state enters into a contract to buy books,
-those books must be of a certain quality. 41 Similarly, the printing
statute only specified the manner in which the contract could be
fulfilled, rather than controlling the interstate price of printing.
The court then surveyed various state supreme court decisions
about trade regulations. 42 The court stated that the general rule from
those cases and subsequent Supreme Court cases 43 was that while
trade regulations are subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny, "statutes
that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are not." 44
The court rejected a contrary opinion in Garden State Dairies
of Vineland, Inc. v_ Sills. 45 In Sills, the New Jersey Supreme Court
examined a statute requiring any vendor supplying milk to a state
agency to certify that it had purchased at least that same amount of
milk from a producer within New Jersey. 46 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reasoned that although the purchase of milk fell within the
proprietary function of the state, the expansion of proprietary
activities was "troublesome" enough that the state could not take
advantage of the presumption that those proprietary activities place
insubstantial burdens on interstate commerce. 47 Rejecting the
rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the American Yearbook
court noted that " [ t] o subject every job specification to an ad hoc
measurement of its effect on interstate commerce would unduly
interfere with state proprietary functions .... "48 Thus, drawing on
Field, MacMillan, and the trade regulations cases, the court held
40
41
42

43

44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 30.
See id. at 31.

The court cited cases from Arizona (Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 255 P.2d
604 (Ariz. 1953)), Colorado (City & Cnty. ofDenverv. Bossie, 266 P. 214 (Colo.
1928)), Idaho (ExparteGemmill, 119 P. 298 (Idaho 1911)), Mississippi (State
ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 76 So. 258 (Miss.
1917)), Missouri (Pasche v. S. St.Joseph Town-Site Co., 190 S.W.
30
(Mo. Ct.
App. 1916)), Montana (Herseyv. Nelson, 131P.30 (Mont.1913)), and North
Dakota (Knight v. Barnes, 75 N.W. 904 (N.D. 1898)). See Am. Yearbook Co. v.
Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 724 n.29 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
The court cited Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) and Polar
Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964). Am. Yearbook, 339
F. Supp. at 724 nn.31-32. With the exception of the Arizona Supreme Court
decision, these cases were decided after the state court cases cited in note 42.
Id. at 725.
217 A.2d 126 (NJ. 1966).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 725.
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that because the statutes fell within the proprietary function of the
state, they did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The American Yearbook court's presumption, and later affirmance
by the Supreme Court, that proprietary functions of the state do not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause directly contributed to the
development of the market participant exception. The exception
allows a state acting like a private producer or purchaser of goods
or services to evade scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court first expressly introduced 49 this doctrine in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 50 four years after American Yearbook
was decided. In Alexandria Scrap, Maryland instituted a regulatory
scheme that paid a monetary reward to processors located in the
state for destroying automobile hulks that were previously titled
in the state.51 The Supreme Court heard the appeal from a threejudge panel that struck down the regulatory scheme on equal
protection and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 52
Applying the balancing test created by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 53 the district court in Alexandria Scrap
explained that "any evaluation of the validity of the impact of a
state statute upon interstate commerce depends not only upon the
strength of local interests, but upon whether those interests can
be promoted by other means." 54 In its rationale, the district court
in Alexandria Scrap performed an in-depth analysis of American
Yearbook's discussion of proprietary and governmental functions
of the state. 55 Ultimately, the Alexandria Scrap district court
incorrectly cited American Yearbook as support for the proposition
49
50
51
52
53

54
55

But see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
426 U.S. 794 (1976) .
Id. at 797.
Id. at 796.
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
(citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960))). The Pike balancing test is still used to evaluate Dormant Commerce
Clause cases that do not fall within the market participant exception. See, e.g.,
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 346 (2007); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond
Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70
Omo ST. LJ. 1179, 1205-06 (2009) (analyzing the Supreme Court's use of the
Pike balancing test in United Haulers).
Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 60 (D. Md. 1975).
Id. at 54-55.
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that the Maryland regulatory scheme was within the state's police
power, but not within its proprietary function. 56 The district court
therefore held that the regulatory scheme was not exempt from
scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
When the Supreme Court evaluated the Commerce Clause
claim in Alexandria Scrap, it did not dispute that Maryland's
regulatory scheme imposed a burden on interstate commerce.
Rather, it questioned whether "Maryland's action [was] a burden
which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect." 57 This
was exactly the rationale that the American Yearbook court used when
it explained that a state can impose any conditions on purchases
it chooses to make. 58 The Supreme Court held that nothing
"prohibits a State, in the absence of Congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." 59 Similarly, the American Yearbook court found
that Commerce Clause did not prevent the facially discriminatory
Florida printing statute from favoring Florida citizens.
After Alexandria Scrap, the Supreme Court heard many seminal
commerce cases, including City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 60 Hughes

56

57

58
59
60

Id. at 55. The Akxandria Scrap district court focused on the purpose of the
purchases, which was to enact the regulatory scheme. Both the American Yearbook

court and the Supreme Court, however, only drew the distinction between a
state entering the market and the direct exercise of police powers. It did not
matter that the purpose of the market participation was to enforce a regulatory
scheme that could othenvise be effected through the state's police powers.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976).Justice William
Brennan 's dissent cited American Yearbook for the proposition that restrictive
purchasing statutes only applied to goods purchased for their "end use. " Id.
at 824 (Brennan,]., dissenting) ("[E]ven those courts and commentators that
have concluded that facially restrictive state purchasing statutes are permissible
under the Commerce Clause ... have restricted this conclusion to instances
where the State in a 'proprietary' capacity is purchasing items of commerce for
end use .... ").This is not quite what the court in American Yearbook actually
concluded. Rather, the court said that a state could set conditions on its
purchases and that the Commerce Clause does not require an inquiry into
the burden on interstate commerce for purchases the state makes. See Am.
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Akxandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
437 U.S. 617 (1978). In City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court struck down,
on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, a ew Jersey law that facially
discriminated between in-state and out-of-state trash, banning the latter. Id. at
629.
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v. Oklahoma, 61 Hunt v. Washingt,on State Appl£ Advertising Commission, 62
and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana. 63 The 1970s and
'80s were an important time for trade regulation, and while these
cases fleshed out Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities
Clause issues related to state regulations on trade, they did not
specifically address the market participant exception. It was not until
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 64 the next market participant case decided by the
Supreme Court, that American Yearbook again reemerged.
In Reeves, the Supreme Court considered a trade regulation case
from South Dakota. The state had opened a cement plant in the
early twentieth century to reduce its chronic cement shortages. 65 The
plant provided cement to the state and several other states in the
region until 1978, when, facing high demand and technical problems
resulting in supply shortages, the State Cement Commission began
fulfilling in-state orders before out-of-state orders. 66 An out-of-state
concrete distributor that relied on cement from the plant sought
an injunction against the facially discriminatory practice. 67 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that South Dakota
had "simply acted in a proprietary capacity," and therefore did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 68 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the decision because of its ruling in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 69 but on remand, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Hughes

61

62

63

64
65
66
67
68
69

441 U.S. 322 (1979). Hughes was a Dormant Commerce Clause case that
struck down a law limiting the number of minnows that could be removed
from Oklahoma rivers. Id. at 338. The Court rejected the legal fiction that a
state owns the animals or resources within its boundaries and, thus, may use
discriminatory regulations. Id. at 339.
432 U.S. 333 (1977). Hunt struck down, on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds, a North Carolina statute that banned the sale of apples bearing an
inspection grade from any organization or government agency other than the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Id. at 352- 53.
436 U.S. 371 (1978). Baldwin upheld the practice of price discrimination
in hunting licenses against out-of-state residents who wanted to hunt within
Montana, despite claims that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 393-94.
447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 433 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230, 1232 (8th Cir. 1978)).
For a brief summary of the case, see supra note 61.

Published by STARS, 2013

9

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 15

322

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

and reaffirmed its earlier decision, setting the stage for a second
review by the Supreme Court. 70
On further review, the Supreme Court noted the distinction
between market regulators and market participants, citing
American Yearbook along with Alexandria Scrap. 71 It found that the
South Dakota cement plant was a market participant and that it
therefore fell within the exception set forth in Al,exandria Scrap. 72
Citing American Yearbook, the Court explained "that the intrinsic
limits of the Commerce Clause do not prohibit state marketplace
conduct." 73
As a district court in Tennessee later observed, "While Al,exandria
Scrap is often regarded as the Supreme Court's first acceptance of
the market participant doctrine, four years earlier, the Court had
affirmed a lower court's ruling sustaining a Florida statute requiring
all public printing ... be done within the state." 74 The summary
affirmance by the Supreme Court in American Yearbook75 is binding
precedent, 76 and as such it should be credited as the first market
participant exception case. While American Yearbook did not lay out
the exception as clearly as did A1£xandria Scrap or Reeves, it laid
out very similar principles. American Yearbook was forward-looking
and arguably the first court to recognize the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, an important piece
of jurisprudence that has lasted for decades.

70

71
72
73
74
75
76

Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1979), afj'd sub nom. Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U .S. 429 (1980). Citing several cases, including American
Yearbook, the Eighth Circuit explained that its previous decision was not based
on the rationale in Hughes and noted that " [a] state may freely purchase to
meet its needs. " Id. at 737 & n.l.
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9. The Court cited as additional support almost a
dozen state cases, including two that also cited American Yearbook. Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 438 n.10.
Barker Bros. Waste v. Dyer Cnty. Legislative Body, 923 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 n .16
(W.D. Tenn. 1996).
Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904, 904 (1972).
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/15

10

